Abstract. Key schedules in lightweight block ciphers are often highly simplified, which causes weakness that can be exploited in many attacks. Today it remains an open problem on how to use limited operations to guarantee enough diffusion of key bits in lightweight key schedules. Also, there are few tools special for detecting weakness in the key schedule. In 2013 Huang et al. pointed out that insufficient actual key information (AKI) in computation chains is responsible for many attacks especially the meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Motivated by this fact, in this paper we develop an efficient (with polynomial time complexity) and effective tool to search the computation chains which involve insufficient AKI for iterated key schedules of lightweight ciphers. The effectiveness of this tool is shown by an application on TWINE-80. Then, we formulate the cause of key bits leakage phenomenon, where the knowledge of subkey bits is leaked or overlapped by other subkey bits in the same computation chain. Based on the interaction of diffusion performed by the key schedule and by the round function, a necessary condition is thus given on how to avoid key bits leakage. Therefore, our work sheds light on the design of lightweight key schedules by guiding how to quickly rule out unreasonable key schedules and maximize the security under limited diffusion.
Introduction
Today the demands of secure communication on source constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks motivate the development of many lightweight block ciphers. In these lightweight ciphers, the security margin that conventional block ciphers are equipped with is reduced as much as possible in order to optimize the software and hardware efficiency. One obvious sacrifice is that the key schedules are highly simplified for saving memory. Some key schedules have round-by-round iteration with low diffusion [20, 3, 21] . Some key schedules do simple permutation or linear operations on master keys [17, 10] . Some have no key schedule, and just use master keys directly in each round [9, 14] . These key schedules are succinct but responsible for many attacks, especially related-key attacks [18, 13] , MITM attacks and their variants [19, 12, 5] , and special attacks such as the invariant subspace attack on PRINTcipher [15] .
Although causing so many risks, the key schedules in lightweight block ciphers are still designed in a heuristic and ad-hoc way, especially when a tradeoff between security and memory constraints should be made. Because of the lack of systematic guidelines, research on design principles of lightweight key schedules is pressing.
Related work
Avoiding MITM attacks and key bits leakage are two of the goals in the design of key schedules [16, 11] . Designers tend to exploit relatively fast diffusion or avalanche to achieve these goals, which is infeasible for lightweight key schedules. The resistance to MITM attacks is usually claimed by ensuring that all master key bits are used within several rounds. Huang et al. show that considering the diffusion of key bits in the "round" level is not enough by investigating the interaction of diffusion between the key schedule and the round function [11] . They also propose a measure called actual key information (AKI) to evaluate the effective speed of diffusing key bits and claim that a computation path should have as high AKI as possible.
From the other aspect, automatic tools have been developed to search cryptanalytic properties relevant to key schedules. Most of these tools focus on searching related-key differential characteristics [8, 1, 2] , while the tools aiming at other weaknesses of key schedules are much fewer. Bouillaguet et al. propose automatic algorithms for searching guess-anddetermine and MITM attacks on round-reduced AES, using the linear relations in the key schedule [4] . Derbez et al. give a way to automatically search the kind of Demirci-Selçuk MITM attacks against AES [7] . Huang et al. present a method to calculate the AKI for 2-round iterated key schedules whose key size is double of the block size [11] .
Our contribution
While the concept of AKI that considers the minimal information of involved key bits in a computation path is meaningful, the algorithm described in [11] targets a too particular type of key schedules. Firstly, the master key size is double of the block size. Secondly, the number of searched rounds is fixed to two. Additionally, the time complexity of this 2-round search is exponential to the key size. If this algorithm is extended to R rounds, the time complexity is exponential to not only the key size but also R, making practical applications infeasible.
Instead of computing AKI for conventional block ciphers, in this paper we consider computing AKI for lightweight block ciphers. We target iterated key schedules with low diffusion, as they exist in a certain amount of lightweight block ciphers. Computing AKI for the static or permutationbased key schedules is much easier, and thus not our concern here. We generalize the problem of computing AKI to any number of rounds in lightweight block ciphers. Then, we develop an efficient and effective algorithm to solve it (Sect. 3). Based on the observation of characters of lightweight iterated key schedules, we use a greedy strategy, resulting in an algorithm with polynomial time complexity. The tools in [7] focus on discovering a special kind of MITM attacks for AES (the Demirci-Selçuk attack that depends on algebraic relations in AES), while our tool aims to present a simple, efficient and generic approach to evaluate the design of iterated key schedules in lightweight ciphers. We show the feasibility of this algorithm by applying it to TWINE-80.
Although the key bits leakage has been mentioned in [11, 16] , it does not achieve deserving attention in cipher design as other properties. This phenomenon is revisited in Sect. 4, and found in almost all the computation paths that contain insufficient information of key bits. We analyze the major cause of key bits leakage by explicitly relating the incidence matrix of the diffusion in key schedules to that of round functions. Furthermore, a formulated necessary criterion for key schedule design is proposed to guide to avoid key bits leakage within a given number of rounds. This necessary criterion can be a guidance of quickly ruling out unreasonable key schedules at first step, and then our tool can be used to do further examination.
Preliminary

Notations
The lightweight block ciphers studied here have a block size of n bits and a master key size of k bits. Each round function includes a key extraction and incorporation layer (AK), and a cipher permutation layer F that updates the n-bit internal state with confusion and diffusion after adding key bits. The output internal state in round i is denoted as s i . The iterated key schedule updates each k-bit key state round-by-round from the previous one. That is, k i = KS(k i−1 ), where k i is the output subkey bits in the ith round of the key schedule, and k 0 is the master key. Normally KS is invertible, thus the size of all k i is k. An rk-bit round key rk i is extracted from k i in the key extraction phase and added to the internal state. The most common case is to apply parts of the subkey k i directly to the round key rk i . Other notations include: The n-bit {x 1 ,x 2 ,...,x n } could be n-bit plaintexts (P) or ciphertexts (C).
A forward computation chain has a calculation direction consistent with the encryption process, while the backward chain is consistent with the decryption process. The length of a chain is denoted as r if it covers r rounds of the block cipher. AKI(K) is the AKI of a set K of subkey bits. Normally, AKI(K) is the key length, but it could be smaller. We give a simple example to explain the above definitions.
In Fig.1 
According to the key schedule (defined by M k ), with the knowledge of {k
Obviously AKI is always not larger than k since the knowledge of all master key bits is enough to produce all subkey bits. For a static key schedule or a permutation-based key schedule, since each subkey is directly derived from some master key bits, it is relatively simple to find the AKI.
A brief description of meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
Among the risks caused by the insufficient AKI in a computation chain, the most serious and relevant ones are MITM attacks and their variants. A basic MITM attack uses the fact that the cipher can be decomposed into two consecutive parts and the computation of each part only involves partial master key (or its mapping). Then, a check point is calculated by each part independently, and used to filter a number of wrong key pairs.
Thus, for mounting an (r f + r b )-round MITM attack, we need at least: an r f -round forward computation chain with o h = E f (∆ f , K f ) where ∆ f ⊂ P, and K f is all involved subkey bits in this forward chain; an r b -round backward computation chain with o h = E b (∆ b , K b ) where ∆ b ⊂ C, and K b is all subkey bits in this backward chain. The total time complexity C comp using N plaintext/ciphertext pairs is:
where K common is the common key bits shared by K f and K b . The MITM attack works faster than the brute force attack when C comp is less than 2 k , which is the required computations for the brute force attack in the worst case.
Automatic Search Tool for Detecting Weakness on Iterated Key Schedules
AKI computation problem
The core of our algorithm is to calculate the AKI of one r-round computation chain. With this algorithm, all r-round computation chains are examined (given a fixed r), so that the one with the least AKI can be found. And by repeating this algorithm with different r, the longest chain with AKI less than k can be determined. Let V be the set of all subkey bits, and they are linked according to the diffusion of key schedules. Record all subkey bits involved in an rround computation chain as a set AV r ⊂ V . Our aim is to find a set BV r ⊂ V such that the subkey bits in BV r can derive all subkey bits in AV r , and find the BV r with the smallest size. More precisely, BV r should satisfy the following property: for each bit b i ∈ AV r , either b i ∈ BV r , or b i can be reached by the bits in BV r , where we define that a subkey bit can be reached iff all its parent subkey bits can be reached. AKI(AV r ) is equal to the size of the smallest BV r .
AV r is determined by the cipher structure, the round function and the key extraction phase. BV r is decided based on AV r and the key schedule. Our tool contains two phases: the precomputation phase and the online phase, which are described in the next two sections. All explanation is for the forward direction, and for the backward direction we only need to exchange the terms of i and i − 1 in our analysis.
Precomputation
The precomputation phase determines AV r of r-round computation chains. In a forward r-round chain, AV r is the set of involved subkey bits (see K f in Sect. 2.3), and decided by the diffusion of round functions (i.e., M s ) and the key extraction phase. Based on our representation of M s , the direction of deducing AV r is opposite to the direction of its corresponding computation chain. That is, a forward computation chain uses ∆ f (plaintext bits) and K f as inputs to compute the output o h , while in the process of computing AV r , we start from the output o h and date back round-by-round to find all related inputs of o h so that K f can be figured out. An r-round computation chain is obtained by multiplying M s r times with an initial state determined by o h . Note that in this way, what we obtain is the involved round key bits in a chain, and they should be traced back to the corresponding subkey bits in the key schedule according to the key extraction phase. For byte or nibble-oriented ciphers, one byte or one nibble can be represented with one bit.
For a fixed length r, there are 2 n possible initial states, hence corresponding to 2 n r-round computation chains. Normally, all these 2 n chains require to be checked to find the one with minimal AKI. However, in fact we only need to enumerate n computation chains based on the following observation: the minimum AKI will be found among the chains whose output are only one bit. Since the AV r starting from one bit in round r are always subsets of the remaining, the initial states with only one active bit (i.e., o h is one bit) always lead to computation chains with less AKI than the chains with more than one active bit in the initial states. In practical attacks, exploitable chains are often among these n ones. The pseudocode that computes AV r starting from the ith bit of the rth round internal state is as Algorithm 1, which will be called n times for different i, i = 1, . . . , n. Hereafter we use AV r [j] (AV r [j 1 ..j 2 ]) to represent the set of related subkey bits in the jth (from j 1 th to j 2 th) round of the r-round chain. 
Online phase
Given AV r and M k , the online phase looks for BV r for AV r . The simplest approach is to brute-force search all predecessors of all subkey bits in AV r as well as themselves, and among these bits find the smallest subset that can derive AV r . Using such method, the time complexity is exponential to the number of all bits, about 2 r·k . For a lightweight block cipher, if the diffusion in the round function is not very fast, the size of AV r is limited by r to a great extent. Also, the low diffusion in the key schedule results in a sparse M k . Thus, the exhaustive search can be pruned efficiently. However, the time complexity is still too high. In practical situations, most of the time a discovery of weakness is already able to demonstrate insecurity of the design. Hence, instead of exhaustively searching to guarantee finding the optimal solution, we can relax our goal to find sub-optimal results which still can satisfy our requirements. This inspires us to exploit a greedy algorithm that makes the best choice at each step with the hope of approximating the optimum finally. It is easier to find a BV r satisfying |BV r | ≤ |AV r | at each step. We expect that with our greedy strategy, the size of final BV r is small enough, and always not larger than the size of AV r and k. Thanks to the characters of iterated lightweight key schedules, our greedy method generates sub-optimal results, while consumes much less time compared with the brute-force searching. If the sub-optimal results we find are already enough to suggest weaknesses in the design, then the real situation of the design may be worse. Since the optimal AKI may indicate fewer key bits involved in a chain, which is even more undesirable for a secure design.
To obtain the final solution, we divide the problem into a series of subproblems, make a choice that is best at the moment, and then keep on applying the greedy strategy to the current result. The choice made each time depends on the choices made so far but not on the future choices. Our greedy choice is based on the following assumption and characteristics of lightweight key schedules. For a forward computation chain:
-Property 1. The orientation of key information is along the encryption direction, i.e., from k i−1 to k i . Thus, we assume that the knowledge of a bits of subkey k i can bring about the knowledge of b bits of k j iff i < j, and a ≥ b 5 . -Property 2. KS is a bijective and invertible mapping, and each round of subkey has k bits information. A subkey bit cannot be derived from other subkey bits in the same round. -Property 3. A majority of rows in M k have Hamming weight 1, and the number of these rows is denoted as N one . In most lightweight key schedules, N one is close to k. The remaining tiny part of the rows in M k have weight larger than 1, while still very small. Denote the maximal Hamming weight among all rows as M AX weight .
Note that Property 1 is made for conveniently explaining our greedy strategy, instead of placing restrictions on the key schedules. Without this assumption, the results may be better but more time complexity is required, i.e., a smaller BV r for the same AV r may be found, since more relations in the key schedule can be utilized among the subkey bits. What we obtain with Algorithm 2 is in fact an upper bound of real AKI. If the upper bound of real AKI is insufficient, then real AKI is more insufficient. We explain how our approach works (see also Algorithm 2) according to the general components required in a greedy algorithm. We start from the given AV r , and each time we try to reduce the size of current AV r while making sure that we still can derive all subkey bits in the original AV r from it according to M k . The subkey bits in the top round 6 of AV r require no process due to Property 1. Thus, we only need to deduce the subkey bits within 2 to r rounds, denoting the number of these bits as n a . At each step we trace the currently remaining n a subkey bits as back as possible. That is, for the bits in round i of AV r (i.e., AV r [i]), we try to deduce them with the least amount of bits in round j, where j < i and j should be as small as possible. If any subset of AV r can be represented with fewer (then the size of AV r is reduced) or equal subkey bits in former rounds 7 , then we remove the original subset from AV r and add these new bits of former rounds to AV r . According to Property 1 and Property 2, deducing the same amount of subkey information to former rounds will increase the chance of leaking other subkey bits, while the total number of subkey bits in AV r doesn't increase. The above process continues until no bits in the current state of AV r can be deduced to former rounds without increasing |AV r |. The final state of AV r is the BV r we want to find. In Algorithm 2, the function GenNextCombination(num) is to generate a combination of num subkey bits from AV r , and each time a subset of num subkey bits selected from the current n a bits is considered.
Algorithm 2 Compute AKI
1: procedure ProcessAVr(num)
Deduce num key bits to former rounds.
2:
S = GenNextCombination(num); S is the set of currently chosen num bits.
3:
while S != NULL do 4:
M IN round = ChooseMinRound(S); 5:
Deduce the bits in S to round i according to M k . 7:
AVr
Include the new bits in round i to AVr.
10:
AVr = AVr -S; Remove the original num bits from AVr. Our method is suitable for both forward and backward directions by using corresponding matrices. We compute the AKI of all computation chains with the same length to find the minimal AKI.
The complexity
The memory complexity of matrix M k is k 2 . The time complexity to build n AV r is O(nr). The memory cost to store AV r corresponds to the diffusion of the round function M s . The total time complexity is dominant by the online phase. The main trick in our algorithm is that we process the subkey bits which can be derived by former one bit (i.e., the in-degree is one) at first. Since most bits in AV r have in-degree one (Property 3), these subkey bits can be deduced to the top rounds directly. Hence, the number of remaining subkey bits that require processing (i.e., n a ) reduces greatly. Because of this sharp decrease of n a , as well as limited M AX weight in lightweight key schedules, GenNextCombination(num) only enumerates the combinations with a time complexity polynomial to n a . When deducing any combinations of current AV r cannot help to reduce the size of AV r , AV r is non-reducible. The total time complexity to obtain the final AKI for one AV r is polynomial to n a r 2 . Examples to explain the time complexity are given in Appendix B. Our results listed in the following sections are obtained within seconds on a PC.
Application to TWINE-80
To show the strength of our tool, we apply it to TWINE-80 [20] and mount a MITM attack based on the found results. The number of rounds we can reach is 14 rounds, while the designers confirmed that the subkeys for the first 3 rounds contain all 80 master key bits. This result is far from reaching the number of rounds of the best known attack in a single key model, which is a 23-round impossible differential attack. However, our attack is the first one with very low data complexity on TWINE-80. Indeed, as pointed out in [6, 4] , it is important to determine the number of rounds that can be attacked with only a few available data, for a better security understanding. Since the attack is not our main concern in this paper and just an example to show the application of the tool, we refer to more details about TWINE-80 and our attack in Appendix A.
Key Bits Leakage
The least AKI in TWINE and PRESENT
As we mentioned before, low data complexity attack is an important research direction to make us understand the security of block ciphers in a "real-life" scenario. If a forward and a backward computation chain with insufficient AKI are discovered, then an adversary is likely to mount an MITM attack even the available data is restricted to only a few pairs of plaintext/ciphertext. Therefore, the least AKI among all forward (backward) chains provides a probable security bound for the low data complexity attack, particularly, the MITM attack. For example, if we know the smallest AKI is 58 bits in all 6-round forward chains, and the smallest AKI is 60 bits in all 6-round backward chains, then basically, we cannot mount any 12-round MITM attacks with time complexity less than about 2 60 . Also, if the least AKI has reached to k bits after r rounds for both forward and backward directions, then the cipher is resistant against 2r-round basic MITM attacks.
In this section, we concern the approximately smallest AKI given the number of rounds, for TWINE and PRESENT. Both of these two ciphers have 64 bits of block size, and 80/128-bit master key. For PRESENT, a 64-bit round key is extracted from the 80/128-bit subkey in each round, while for TWINE a 32-bit (8 nibbles) round key is extracted from the 80/128-bit subkey in each round. Again, we use one bit to represent one nibble for TWINE. Our search covers different rounds until the AKI is larger than k. The results are in Table 1 . Details of some chains with the least AKI in Table  1 are given in Appendix B. The theoretical value of AKI can be computed by the diffusion of round function. Indeed, it is the total number of round key bits we expect to have in a computation chain, i.e., |AV r |, and is not larger than k. Take Fig.1 as an example again, the number of involved round key bits (the grey boxes) in the chain is 7. However, all 6 bits of the master key should be enough to derive these 7 bits, which means that the theoretical AKI of this chain is 6 bits.
Remark. As we mentioned before, the real AKI of a chain could be less than what we find, thus our results in fact indicate a necessary but not sufficient security bound.
The authors in [11] mention three causes responsible for poor key schedules: the size of round keys is too small, no avalanche effect, and key bits leakage. However, no details about these causes are discussed carefully. In the next, we will focus on the key bits leakage.
Key bits leakage and three examples
We find that, almost all chains whose practical AKI are less than the theoretical one have a particular phenomenon, where the knowledge of subkey bits are leaked by some other subkey bits in the same chain. This phenomenon is denoted as key bits leakage.
Besides the structure of the cipher, for iterated key schedules the interplay of diffusion patterns between key schedules and round functions plays a crucial role on this phenomenon. In this section, we use three examples to demonstrate different levels of key bits leakage caused by different interaction of M s and M k . Recall that M s and M k are the incidence matrices of diffusion in round functions and key schedules, respectively.
The M s and different M k of these three cases.
Assume that we already have the round transformation for a block cipher, and now we need to compare the security of three candidate key schedules that have the same level of diffusion (i.e., to some extent they have the same efficiency). Here, we use the same cipher structure as Fig.1 . The block size is equal to the key size and every internal state bit is XORed by one bit of the round key. All these three cases share the same M s , as in (a) of Fig.2 , and the three key schedules correspond to different M k as in (b), (c) and (d) of Fig.2 . They have the same level of diffusion: three subkey bits are respectively derived from two subkey bits of the previous round, and the remaining three subkey bits only depend on one bit in the previous round. Therefore, a common property in three M k is that they all have three rows with weight 2 and three rows with weight 1.
The first case (replace the M k in Fig.1 
bits in total. Thus, what we expect is that 6 bits of the master key are all exploited in this 4-round chain. However,
This reveals the situation far from our anticipation: once k 0 [0] and k 0 [1] are known, the remaining five key bits are not required to guess. Therefore, this computation chain actually contains only two key bits, and the AKI is 2. The ratio between AKI and the theoretical value (6 bits) now is 1 3 , meaning that only 33.3% of the key bits in this chain are effective.
Above is the worst case of key bits leakage in a block cipher. Apparently, this is a bad example for cipher design when M s and M k have incomplete diffusion. More generally, we should avoid constructing homologous M s and M k in lightweight block ciphers, since the low diffusion will make the consequence of key bits leakage worse.
For the second case, similarly we compute AKI according to M k in (c) of Fig.2 and find that all 4-round computation chains have 5 bits of AKI. Again for the third case, the AKI of all 4-round chains are 6 bits, meaning that the whole key space is covered now. The security of these two cases is much better than the first case. Thus, we can conclude that not only the amount of diffused bits but also the positions of diffused bits can affect the number of actual key information in a computation chain. With the same amount of diffusion operations, some diffusing patterns will cause severe key bits leakage, while others will not.
How to Avoid Key Bits Leakage
In practical design, we hope that key bits leakage does not occur in any round and the AKI can be guaranteed as large as possible in every chain. Hereafter, in our multiplication between matrices and vectors, bit-addition is OR and bit-multiplication is AND. The sum of binary matrices or vectors, denoted as , is a bitwise OR of these vectors or matrices.
The cause of key bits leakage
After examining the computation chains with least AKI in Table 1 , as well as other chains having much lower AKI compared to the theoretical value, we find that almost all of them have the following property: for the computation chain starting from e j , we can always derive subkeys in this chain from fewer key bits in the top round 8 . That is,
Recall that | · | is the Hamming weight of the binary vector, M i s is the matrix of M s to the power of i, the sum of weight ( in the right side) is a sum over integers. The same notations are used hereafter.
Also, the number of finally involved key bits in the top round that can derive all subkey bits in the chain is less than the master key size. i.e.,
For example, in Table 1 , Eq.(1) and Eq.(2) hold for the 6 to 11 rounds of TWINE-128. The theoretical value is min(
where the ratio of AKI and the theoretical value is smaller than 1. Note that
is just the upper bound of AKI, since we may be able to find a set of fewer subkey bits from different rounds (instead of only from the top round) that also can be used to compute all key bits in the chain. However, the first equality sign in Eq.(3) can be obtained for most of the cases we checked for PRESENT and TWINE. This means that the smallest set of subkey bits that can derive all key bits in the chain is selected from the top round. There are two probable reasons responsible for this. Firstly, a large number of rows have weight 1 in M k so that most subkey bits can directly date back to previous rounds without diffusing. Also, even for the remaining small quantity of rows having weight larger than 1, these weights are low and sometimes neighboring (e.g. the key schedule of PRESENT).
Necessary condition for avoiding key bits leakage
Based on the above cause, we explicitly formulate a necessary condition for avoiding key bits leakage, i.e., gaining the maximal AKI in each computation chain. The tool in Sect. 3 can compute the AKI for each chain and check the ratio. However, this only can be done after the key schedule has been designed. Here we give a design principle only in terms of M s and M k , so that we can use it as a guideline when designing the key schedule for a known M s . For convenience and w.l.o.g., we take the case that M s and M k have a equal size k again. In the case where they have different sizes, M s just needs to be merged or converted according to the key extraction phase. 
where | · | j represents the Hamming weight of the jth row of the matrix.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a effective and efficient tool to automatically search AKI in iterated key schedules of lightweight block ciphers. Also, we formulate the cause of key bits leakage phenomenon from the point of the relation of incidence matrices that represent diffusion of round functions and key scheduling. Based on this cause, a necessary condition on how to avoid key bits leakage in design of lightweight key schedules is given, which can be a guidance of quickly ruling out unreasonable key schedules and maximizing security under low diffusion. In further research we will consider using our algorithm and the necessary condition to examine more designs of lightweight key schedules. Take the corresponding key values for K f as well as current key value for K b as candidate keys. 8: Exhaustively search each remaining candidate key.
B Details of computation chains in Table 1 For TWINE-128, o h is the output nibble of the chain, s i [j] here is the jth nibble of the internal state in round i, and k i [j] (k i [j 1 − j 2 ]) is the jth (j 1 to j 2 ) output subkey nibble(s) in the ith round of key schedule. For PRESENT-128, the results are bit-oriented. The subkey bits (nibbles) in BV r are enough to compute the output o h of the r-round chain. For PRESENT-128, 120 rows of M k have weight 1, and 8 rows have weight 4. We consider the 4-round chain with the least AKI, which is 125 bits. The size of original AV 4 is 148 bits, and n a is 84. After we deduce all one in-degree cases, n a decreases to 4. Then we can quickly deduce these 4 bits 2-by-2, 3-by-3, and 4-by-4.
